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Abstract
Most learning models assume players are adaptive (i.e. they respond only
to their own previous experience and ignore others' payo information) and
behavior is not sensitive to the way in which players are matched. Em-
pirical evidence suggests otherwise. In this paper, we extend our adaptive
experience-weighted attraction (EWA) learning model to capture sophisti-
cated learning and strategic teaching in repeated games.
The generalized model assumes there is a mixture of adaptive learners and
sophisticated players. Like before, an adaptive learner adjusts his behavior
the EWA way. A sophisticated player however does not learn and rationally
best-responds to her forecasts of all other behaviors. A sophisticated player
can be either myopic or foresighted. A foresighted player develops multiple-
period rather than single-period forecasts of others' behaviors and chooses to
`teach' the other players by choosing a strategy scenario that gives her the
highest discounted net present value. Consequently a foresighted player can
develop a reputation for herself by strategic teaching if she is matched with
an adaptive player repeatedly.
We estimate the model using data from p-beauty contests and repeated
trust games. The generalized model is better than the adaptive EWA model
in describing and predicting behavior. Including teaching also allows an em-
pirical learning-based approach to reputation formation which is at least as
plausible as the standard type-based approach.
1. INTRODUCTION
The process by which an equilibrium arises in a market or game has
been a substantial mystery until recent years. Models of general equilib-
rium assume that equilibration comes from price-change rules implemented
by a ¯ctional Walrasian auctioneer (who is presumably a stand-in for some
dynamic process which is typically unspeci¯ed). An implicit model of equi-
libration in game theory is that players ¯gure out an equilibrium in a game,
or adhere to a recommendation by an outside arbiter (perhaps a consortium
of advisors or a government agency) if it is self-enforcing (e.g., Kohlberg
and Mertens [39]). Biological models ascribe equilibration to genetic repro-
duction as well as mutation and natural selection. Early on, Nash spoke
of a \mass action" interpretation of equilibration akin to natural selection
(which is similar to modern accounts of cultural evolution).
None of these perspectives is likely to completely explain the actual time
scale of equilibration in complex games played by humans. Humans learn
faster than biological models predict, but not as fast (instantly!) as intro-
spection. Therefore, a variety of other learning dynamics have been stud-
ied. Most studies ask about theoretical convergence properties of dynamics,
primarily to see which equilibria they converge to (if any). This paper is
about the empirical ¯t of learning models to experimental data. Our goal
is to explain as accurately as possible, for every choice in an experiment,
how that choice arose from a player's previous behavior and experience.
We also strive to explain these choices using a general model which can be
applied to any normal-form game with minimal customization.
The model we use extends the \experience-weighted attraction" (EWA)
model of (Camerer and Ho [8], [9], [10]).1 The key property of EWA is that
it hybridizes features of popular learning rules, particularly reinforcement
and belief learning (of the weighted ¯ctitious play type), which have been
widely studied in game theory. Hybridizing these familiar rules is useful for
two purposes, one empirical and one theoretical. The empirical purpose is
to ¯t and predict data better. Studies have found that the hybrid EWA
typically improves substantially (and signi¯cantly) on reinforcement and
belief models, in 31 data sets spanning a dozen di®erent types of games
(see details below). We are not aware of any learning model that has
performed as well in that many statistical comparisons.
* This research was supported by NSF grants SBR 9730364 and SBR 9730187. Many
thanks to Vince Crawford, Drew Fudenberg, David Hsia, John Kagel, and Xin Wang for
discussions and help. Helpful comments were also received from seminar participants at
Berkeley, Caltech, Harvard, Hong Kong UST, and Wharton.
1The model has also been applied to signaling games (Anderson and Camerer [2]),
extensive-form centipede games (Camerer, Ho and Wang [11]) and bilateral call markets
(Camerer, Hsia and Ho [12]).
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The theoretical point of EWA is that belief learning and reinforcement
learning are not di®erent species; they are actually close cousins. When be-
liefs are formed according to weighted ¯ctitious play, and used to calculate
expected payo®s, those expected payo®s are exactly equal to a weighted
average of previous payo®s, including \foregone payo®s" of strategies which
were not chosen. Reinforcement models are averages (or cumulations) of
previously received payo®s, excluding foregone payo®s. The only impor-
tant di®erence between belief and reinforcement models is therefore the
extent to which they assume players include foregone payo®s in evaluating
strategies. In the EWA model, this di®erence is parameterized by a weight
±.2
This paper overcomes two important limitations of all adaptive models
(including EWA and the special cases of reinforcement and belief learning).
One limitation is that adaptive players do not anticipate how others are
learning and do not use knowledge of other players' payo®s (if they have it)
to outguess their opponents. We add \sophistication" to the EWA model
using two parameters. We assume a fraction ® of players are sophisticated.
Sophisticated players think that a fraction (1¡ ®0) of players are adaptive
and the remaining fraction ®0 of players are sophisticated like themselves.
They use the adaptive EWA model to forecast what the adaptive players
will do, and choose strategies with high expected payo®s given their fore-
cast. This `self-consciousness' assumption creates a small whirlpool of re-
cursive thinking which implies that standard equilibrium concepts (Nash),
and sensible generalizations like quantal response equilibrium (QRE; McK-
elvey and Palfrey [43], [44]), are special cases of sophisticated EWA.
The idea of sophistication has been used before, in models of \level-k"
learning (Ho, Camerer, and Weigelt [32], Stahl [66]; cf. Stahl and Wilson,
[69]) and anticipatory learning (Selten [63]), although our parameterization
is di®erent. It shows that equilibrium concepts combine \social calibra-
tion" (accurate guesses about the fraction of players who are sophisticated,
® = ®0) with full sophistication (® = 1). But these two features can be
separated in principle, and it proves to be empirically useful to do so. The
model is applied to data from p-beauty contest games (Nagel [49], Ho,
Camerer and Weigelt [32]) and improves the ¯t substantially over purely
adaptive models.
The second limitation of adaptive models is that they do not explain
why behavior may depend on how players are matched with each other.
Sophisticated players who are matched with the same players repeatedly
may have an incentive to \teach" adaptive players, by choosing strategies
with poor short-run payo®s which will change what adaptive players do, in
2When foregone payo®s are not known for sure, then elements of a set of possible
payo®s or previously observed payo®s, can be used for `payo® learning' (Anderson and
Camerer [2], Camerer, Ho and Wang [11]).
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a way that bene¯ts the sophisticated player in the long-run. This kind of
\strategic teaching" has been shown to give rise to repeated-game equilibria
and reputation formation behavior through the interaction between \long-
run" and \short-run" or myopic players (e.g., Fudenberg and Levine [25],
Watson [72]). It also respects the fact that the way in which players are
rematched makes an empirical di®erence in their behavior (they cannot
\teach" in a protocol with no-repeat random matching, for example, and
they do not appear to do so in experiments; e.g., Andreoni and Miller [3],
Clark and Sefton [17]). We allow for teaching by adding a parameter ²
to the sophisticated EWA model which represents the weight on future
payo®s (like a discount factor). If ² = 0, a player is sophisticated but does
not incorporate the e®ects of current actions on future payo®s, i.e. she
does not teach. If ² = 1, the player fully accounts for the likely e®ects of
current actions on future payo®s (as in standard repeated-game models).
We estimate the teaching model on data from experiments on repeated
trust games. The model ¯ts reasonably well although the data are noisy,
and there is noticeable cross-session variation. It also exhibits the main pat-
terns predicted by sequential equilibrium based on updating of entrants'
beliefs about an incumbent's \type". Sophisticated EWA with strategic
teaching therefore provides a boundedly rational model of reputation for-
mation without the complicated apparatus of Harsanyi \types".
The next section describes the adaptive EWA model, motivates its struc-
ture, and brie°y reviews earlier evidence. Section 3 introduces sophistica-
tion and shows empirical estimates from p-beauty contest games. Section
4 develops the teaching model and shows the empirical estimates from re-
peated trust games. Section 5 concludes.
2. ADAPTIVE EWA LEARNING
2.1. The Model
We start with notation. In n-person normal-form games, players are
indexed by i (i = 1; : : : ; n). The strategy space of player i, Si consists
of mi discrete choices, that is, Si = fs1i ; s2i ; : : : ; smi¡1i ; smii g. S = S1 £
: : : £ Sn is the Cartesian product of the individual strategy spaces and
is the strategy space of the game. si 2 Si denotes a strategy of player
i, and is therefore an element of Si. s = (s1; : : : ; sn) 2 S is a strategy
combination, and it consists of n strategies, one for each player. s¡i =
(s1; : : : ; si¡1; si+1; : : : ; sn) is a strategy combination of all players except
i. S¡i has a cardinality of m¡i = ¦nj=1;j6=imj . The scalar-valued payo®
function of player i is ¼i(si; s¡i). Denote the actual strategy chosen by
player i in period t by si(t), and the strategy (vector) chosen by all other
players by s¡i(t). Denote player i's payo® in a period t by ¼i(si(t); s¡i(t)).
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EWA assumes each strategy has a numerical attraction, which deter-
mines the probability of choosing that strategy (in a precise way made
clear below). Learning models require a speci¯cation of initial attractions,
how attractions are updated by experience, and how choice probabilities
depend on attractions. The core of the EWA model is two variables which
are updated after each round. The ¯rst variable is N(t), which we inter-
pret as the number of `observation-equivalents' of past experience relative
to one period of current experience. (A player with a low N(t) puts little
weight on past attractions; a player with a huge N(t) is barely a®ected by
immediate experience.) The second variable is Aji (a; t), an adaptive player
i's attraction of strategy j after period t has taken place.3
The variablesN(t) and Aji (a; t) begin with prior values, N(0) and A
j
i (a; 0).
These prior values can be thought of as re°ecting pregame thinking or ex-
perience, either due to learning transferred from di®erent games or due to
introspection. (Then N(0) can be interpreted as the number of periods of
actual experience which is equivalent in attraction impact to the pregame
thinking.)
Updating is governed by two rules. The ¯rst rule updates the level of
attraction. A key component of the updating is the payo® that a strategy
either yielded, or would have yielded, in a period. The model weights hypo-
thetical payo®s that unchosen strategies would have earned by a parameter
±, and weights payo®s actually received, from chosen strategy si(t), by an
additional 1 ¡ ± (so they receive a total weight of 1). Using an indicator
function I(x; y) which equals 1 if x = y and 0 if x6= y, the weighted payo®
can be written as [± + (1¡ ±) ¢ I(sji ; si(t))] ¢ ¼i(sji ; s¡i(t)).
The parameter ± measures the relative weight given to foregone payo®s,
compared to actual payo®s, in updating attractions. It can be interpreted
as a kind of `imagination' of foregone payo®s, or `simulation' of outcomes
under alternative competitive scenarios, or responsiveness to foregone pay-
o®s. When ± is higher, players move more strongly, in a statistical sense,
toward \ex post best responses".
The rule for updating attraction sets Aji (a; t) to be the sum of a de-
preciated, experience-weighted previous attraction Aji (a; t ¡ 1) plus the
(weighted) payo® from period t, normalized by the updated experience
weight:
Aji (a; t) =
Á ¢N(t¡ 1) ¢ Aji (a; t¡ 1)
N(t)
+
[± + (1¡ ±) ¢ I(sji ; si(t))] ¢ ¼i(sji ; s¡i(t))
N(t)
: (1)
3To prepare our notation for subsequent inclusion of sophistication, we use a inAji (a; t)
to identify the attraction of an adaptive player; s is associated with a sophisticated player.
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Note well that while we assume players are reinforced by their mone-
tary payo®s, the reinforcement function could easily be altered to account
for loss-aversion (the aversion to losses compared to equal-sized gains; cf.
Tversky and Kahneman [70]), or for payo®s which re°ect social preferences
like fairness, reciprocity, inequality-aversion, and so forth (as in Cooper
and Stockman [18]). One could also subtract an aspiration level or ref-
erence point (which may change) from payo®s, which is useful for keep-
ing reinforcement models from getting \stuck" at nonequilibrium \satis¯c-
ing" responses; EWA does something like this automatically, with no extra
parameters.4
The decay rate Á re°ects a combination of forgetting, and the degree to
which players realize other players are adapting, so that old observations
on what others did become less and less useful. When Á is lower, players
discard old observations more quickly and are responsive to the most recent
observations.
The second rule updates the amount of experience:
N(t) = (1¡ ·) ¢ Á ¢N(t¡ 1) + 1; t ¸ 1: (2)
The parameter · determines the growth rate of attractions, which re-
°ects how quickly players lock in to a strategy.5 When · = 0, attractions




Á¢N(t¡1)+1 ); so that attractions cannot grow outside the
bounds of the payo®s in the game. When · = 1 attractions cumulate, so
attractions can be much larger than stage-game payo®s.
While we have not explicitly subscripted the key parameters ±; ·, and Á,
they can obviously be di®erent for di®erent players or games (see Camerer,
Ho and Wang [11]).
Attractions must determine probabilities of choosing strategies in some
way. That is, P ji (a; t) should be monotonically increasing in A
j
i (a; t) and
decreasing in Aki (a; t) (where k 6= j). Three forms have been used in
previous research: Exponential (logit), power, and normal (probit). We
use the logit because it has compared favorably to the others in direct tests
(Camerer and Ho [8]) and gracefully accomodates negative payo®s. The
4A strategy only increases in probability (holding previous attractions constant) if
its payo® is above an average of the ±¡weighted foregone payo®s. Thus, EWA mimics
a process in which reinforcements are payo®s minus an aspiration level which adjusts
endogenously (re°ecting foregone payo®).
5In our earlier papers (Camerer and Ho [8], [9], [10]), we de¯ne ½ = (1 ¡ ·) ¢ Á and
call it the rate of decay for experience. The · notation makes it clearer that the key
di®erence is the extent to which attractions either average or cumulate.
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logit form is:








The parameter ¸ measures sensitivity of players to attractions. Sensi-
tivity could vary due to the psychophysics of perception, whether subjects
are highly motivated or not, or could re°ect an unobserved component of
payo®s (including variety-seeking, errors in computation, and so forth).
2.2. The EWA Learning Cube
Figure 1 shows a cube with axes representing the imagination parameter
±, the change parameter Á, and the lock-in parameter ·. Many existing
theories are restricted cases of EWA learning which are represented by cor-
ners or edges of the cube. For example, cumulative reinforcement, average
reinforcement, weighted ¯ctitious play are edges and Cournot and ¯ctitious
play are vertices of this cube, as shown in the ¯gure.
When ± = 0; · = 1 (and N(0) = 1), then N(t) = 1 and the attrac-
tion updating equation becomes Aji (a; t) = Á ¢ Aji (a; t ¡ 1) + I(sji ; si(t)) ¢
¼i(s
j
i ; s¡i(t)). This is the simplest form of cumulative choice reinforcement
(Roth and Erev [58] and Erev and Roth [24]). When ± = 0; · = 0 (and
N(0) = 1=(1 ¡ Á)), the attraction updating equation becomes Aji (a; t) =
Á ¢Aji (a; t¡1)+(1¡Á) ¢I(sji ; si(t)) ¢¼i(sji ; s¡i(t)). This is a form of averaged
choice reinforcement (attractions are averages of previous attractions and
incremental reinforcement) (e.g., Mookerjee and Sopher [47]; cf. Sarin and
Vahid [60]). The key property of reinforcement models is that they assume
people ignore foregone payo®s. This simplifying assumption is most defen-
sible in low-information environments in which players do not know much
about the payo® landscape (although even then, more sophisticated rules
might be used as players learn about foregone payo®s; e.g., Camerer, Ho,
and Wang [11], Anderson and Camerer [2]). However, in most experimen-
tal games that have been studied empirically, players do know foregone
payo®s and seem to respond to them. There is even evidence that pigeons
are sensitive to foregone payo®s!6
6Gallistel [28] (chapter 11) explains that the tendency of pigeons to \probability
match" in binary choice experiments is a®ected by information about foregone payo®s.
Speci¯cally, pigeons tended to maximize, choosing one of two levers with the highest
chance of delivering a reward all the time, when the pigeons knew after an unsuccessful
trial that the other lever would have delivered a reward. (How did the pigeons \know"?
Because a light displayed above a lever came on afterwards only if the lever had been
armed for reward. If the light came on above the lever they did not choose, they `knew'
the foregone payo®.) When the pigeons did not know about the foregone payo®s (no
light told them which lever had been armed to deliver food), they tended to \probability
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A more surprising restricted case is weighted ¯ctitious play (Brown [5],
Fudenberg and Levine [26]).7 When ± = 1; · = 0, then the attractions





is, attractions are weighted averages of lagged attractions and either real-
ized or foregone payo®s. This sort of belief learning is a special kind of
generalized reinforcement because beliefs can be written in the form of a
di®erence equation. When beliefs are used to calculate expected payo®s for
strategies, then the expected payo®s can also be written in the form of a dif-
ference equation: Expected payo®s are equal to previous expected payo®s
and the increment in expected payo® which results from the updated belief.
In the expected payo® equation, the belief disappears. The trick is that
since beliefs are only used to compute possible future payo®s, and beliefs
are backward-looking, possible future payo®s can be computed directly by
incrementing expected payo®s to account for the \recently possible" fore-
gone payo®. Seen this way, the di®erence between simple reinforcement
and belief learning is a matter of degree, rather than kind (particularly the
value of ±).
The parametric relation between belief and reinforcement models is sub-
tle and went unnoticed for decades.8 Why? One reason was that reinforce-
ment theorists liked the idea of reinforcement precisely because it seemed to
avoid \mentalist" constructs like beliefs. Furthermore, weighted ¯ctitious
play was ¯rst introduced in game theory as a heuristic way for players to
reason their way to an equilibrium, not as a literal theory of how players
lean from observation. It emerged from a way of thinking about learning
that was (apparently) quite di®erent from reinforcement.
Indeed, there is no compelling empirical reason to think parameter con-
¯gurations which characterize human behavior will necessarily lie on the
edges corresponding to belief and reinforcement learning, rather than on
other edges or some interior regions. The kind of `empirical privilege' that
would justify focusing attention in those regions could have come from a
variety of studies which continually show that measured parameters clus-
ter in one portion of the cube. But that hasn't happened because nobody
imagined the cube until recently. Most studies compare models from one
corner or vertex with a static benchmark (usually Nash equilibrium). These
match" (to choose each lever about as often as that lever delivered a reward). So even
pigeons notice foregone payo®s.
7Weighted ¯ctitious play is a discrete dependent variable form of the adaptive expec-
tations equation introduced by Cagan and Friedman in macroeconomics.
8For example, Selten [64] wrote \: : : in rote (reinforcement) learning success and failure
directly in°uence the choice probabilities. : : : Belief Learning is very di®erent. Here
experiences strengthen or weaken beliefs. Belief learning has only an indirect in°uence
on behavior." EWA makes clear, however, that the indirect in°uence of learning of
beliefs (for weighted ¯ctitious play) can be exactly mimicked by direct in°uence.
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studies provide little information about which learning rules{ i.e., points
in the cube{ most accurately characterize how people learn.
2.3. Empirical Evidence
What parameters best characterize human learning? In previous empiri-
cal research, EWA has been used to ¯t and predict data from order-statistic
coordination games (Camerer and Ho [9], [10]), p-beauty contests (Camerer
and Ho [10]), mixed strategy games (Camerer and Ho [10]), n-person (Hsia
[36]) and bilateral (Camerer, Hsia and Ho [12]) call-markets, cost alloca-
tion processes (Chen and Khoroshilov [16]), extensive-form centipede games
(Camerer, Ho and Wang [11]),\unpro¯table" games (Morgan and Sefton
[48]), signaling games (Anderson and Camerer [2]), patent race games with
iteratively dominated strategies (Rapoport and Amaldoss [55]), patent race
games (Amaldoss [1]), and 5x5 matrix games (Stahl [68]).9
Table 1a-b summarize EWA parameter estimates and goodness-of-¯t
statistics from these 31 data sets. The goodness-of-¯t statistic is ¡1 times
log likelihood except in Chen and Khoroshilov [16]. The column \EWA"
reports the ¡LL of the EWA model. The reinforcement and belief mod-
els report the di®erence between the -LL's of those models and the EWA
statistic. (Positive di®erences mean that EWA ¯ts better.)
Values of ± tend to be between .5 and 1 in most studies except those in
which games have only mixed-strategy equilibria, where ± is close to zero.
The value of Á is reliably around .9 or so, with a couple of exceptions.
What about model comparisons? The fairest comparisons estimate pa-
rameters on part of a sample of data and forecast choices out-of-sample, so
that models with more parameters will not necessarily ¯t better. (Indeed,
if they succeed in-sample by over¯tting, they will predict poorly out-of-
sample.) In those 11 out-of-sample comparisons (denoted \OUT" in the
third column from the right), EWA always outperforms reinforcement, al-
though usually modestly. EWA outperforms belief learning in 9 of 11 cases,
quite dramatically in some data sets.
Of course, EWA necessarily ¯ts better in the other 20 in-sample compar-
isons than reinforcement and belief models which are special cases. One can
use standard statistical techniques for penalizing more complex models {
the Â2 test, and Akaike and Bayesian criteria. These techniques are created
so that if the special case restriction is true, the penalized ¯t of the more
complex model will be worse than the ¯t of the restricted model. EWA
generally does better even after applying these penalties. For example, if
the di®erence in LL is 4 points or more then the special-case restriction
will be rejected by the Â2 test. By this criterion, EWA is more accurate
9Ho and Chong [33] applied the EWA model to ¯t and predict 130,000 consumer
product purchases in supermarkets and found that EWA model ¯t substantially better
than existing reinforcement models.
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than belief learning in all in-sample comparisons, and more accurate than
reinforcement in 16 out of 20 comparisons.
Figure 1 shows the locations of estimated parameter combinations from
20 games in Table 110 in the EWA cube. Each point represents a single
game. The ¯rst observation is that points do not particularly cluster on
the edges or corners corresponding to extreme-case theories, except for a
few points in the lower corner corresponding to averaged reinforcement
(± = · = 0, and Á close to one). The second observation is that points
are dispersed throughout the cube. Either learning rules are fundamentally
di®erent in di®erent games{ which creates the need for some theory of which
parameter combinations are used in which games{ or there may be some
way to add something to the model to create more stability in parameter
estimates.
Interestingly, three of four vertices on the · = 0 and · = 1 faces of
the cube have been studied previously, but one has not. The fourth ver-
tex, in which players are fully responsive to foregone payo®s (± = 1) but
attractions cumulate rather than average past payo®s (· = 0), does not
correspond to any familiar learning theory (cf. McAllister [41]). However,
the estimates from the three order-statistic coordination games are close to
this segment. This vertex is also prominent in our estimates of the p-beauty
contest game reported below. These results show an advantage of thinking
about points in the learning cube. Parameter con¯gurations which have
never been combined previously turned out to characterize learning in some
data sets better than models like belief and reinforcement learning which
have been studied for ¯fty years.
We end this introductory section with a few comments. First, others
have explored the econometric properties of EWA and some special cases
of it. The news is not all good. For example, Salmon [62] ¯nds with
simulations that in 2x2 games, reinforcement, belief, and EWA models are
often poorly recoverable in the sense that rule Y cannot be rejected as a
good ¯t of data actually generated by a di®erent learning rule X. EWA does
least poorly in this sense because it does properly identify the value of ±.
That is, when the data are generated by reinforcement (belief) models with
±=0 (=1), EWA model estimates are close to the correct value of ±. Blume
et al. [4] ¯nd fairly good econometric performance of EWA and some other
rules, when there are repeated samples and a substantial span of data. We
regard these studies as harsh reminders that learning researchers should
be more careful about investigating econometric properties of estimators
before rushing to apply them. More constructively, pretests like this will
10In some studies, the same game was played at di®erent stakes levels. In these cases,
estimates were averaged across stakes levels.
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help guide the choice of games and experiment lengths which are most
likely to produce good econometric recovery.
Second, it would be useful to ¯nd interesting ways to economize on EWA
parameters, creating a \EWA Lite". Since Á captures something about sub-
jects' awareness of how their opponents are changing, ± captures subjects'
sensitivity to foregone payo®s, and · captures their desirability of locking
in to a good strategy, making these parameters functions of observed his-
tory is a plausible way to go. Indeed, we have recently developed such
an EWA Lite model and showed that it performs almost as well as the
adaptive EWA model (Ho, Camerer, and Chong [31]). Excluding the ini-
tial conditions (which can be ¯xed by burning in the ¯rst-period data),
the EWA Lite has only the payo® sensitivity parameter ¸ to be estimated.
This one-parameter EWA Lite model should appeal to modelers who want
a highly parsimonious model for describing learning behaviors in games.
Finally, it would certainly be useful to prove something about the long-
run behavior of EWA players (cf. Hopkins [35]). Heller and Sarin [30] make
a much-needed start in this direction. We conjecture that if · = 0 (so that
attractions are weighted averages of previous attractions and payo®s), then
EWA players will converge to something akin to ²-equilibrium (at least in
those classes of games where ¯ctitious play converges) and ² will depend on
± and the payo®s in the game. The idea is that players could converge to
a non-best response, but only if their stable payo® ¼stable is greater than ±
times the highest (best response) foregone payo® ¼br. The gap ¼br¡¼stable
is a measure of ². This may help explain why convergence in games with
mixed-strategy equilibria is often so noisy, and such games are often a
very poor way to distinguish models (e.g. Salmon [62]). Since mixed-
strategy equilibria have knife-edge equilibria (the equilibrium mixtures are
only weak best responses, by de¯nition), the set of ²-equilibrium will often
be much larger than the mixed equilibrium. Perhaps what we often observe
in these games is players wandering among a large set of ²-equilibria which
are produced by EWA equilibration.
3. EWA LEARNING WITH SOPHISTICATION
For game theorists steeped in a tradition of assuming players reason
thoughtfully about the behavior of others, introducing sophistication into
learning is a natural step; indeed, not assuming sophistication might seem
strange. However, our standards are entirely empirical. We would like
to know whether adding sophistication to an adaptive model parsimo-
niously (and the reverse, \dumbing down" sophisticated models by adding
unsophistication) helps explain how people behave.
There are several empirical reasons to allow the possibility of sophistica-
tion:
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1. Players do use information about others' payo®s. Several experiments
that compare behavior with and without other-payo® information found
a signi¯cant di®erence (Partow and Schotter [54], Mookerjee and Sopher
[46], Cachon and Camerer [6]). The use of other-payo® information can
also be tested directly, by measuring whether players open boxes on a
computer screen that contain payo®s of other players. They do (Costa-
Gomes, Crawford, and Broseta [19]; cf. Camerer, Johnson, Sen and Rymon
[13]).
2. If players are sophisticated, the way in which they are matched when
a game is played repeatedly can a®ect behavior. For example, compared
to the random-opponent matching protocol, the ¯xed-opponent matching
protocol should encourage players to adopt repeated game strategies.
3. Ho et al. [32] show that experienced subjects who played a second
p-beauty contest converge signi¯cantly faster to Nash equilibrium than in-
experienced subjects. This can be interpreted as evidence that players
learned from the ¯rst p-beauty contest about how others were learning,
which means they became increasingly sophisticated.
4. There is direct evidence in some games that players change strategies
in ways which are inconsistent with adaptation, and consistent with sophis-
tication. For example, Rapoport, Lo and Zwick [56] studied market entry
games in which players had to enter one of three markets (see Ochs [52]
for an overview). If a particular market was \under-entered", relative to
the Nash equilibrium entry rate, then any sensible adaptive model (such
as EWA and the restricted cases) predict more entry into that market in
the next trial. In fact, players tended to enter even less frequently on sub-
sequent trials, which is consistent with sophistication (i.e., expecting too
much entry, and hence avoiding that market) rather than adaptation.
3.1. The Model
The population is assumed to consist of both adaptive learners and so-
phisticated players. We denote the proportion of sophisticated players by
® and the proportion of adaptive players by (1 ¡ ®). Adaptive learners
follow the EWA learning rules and sophisticated players develop forecasts
of others by assuming (1¡®0) proportion of the players are adaptive EWA
learners and the rest are like themselves and best-respond to those fore-
casts.
Adaptive EWA learners follow the updating and probability equations
(1)-(3). The sophisticated players have attractions and choice probabilities
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speci¯ed as follows11
Aji (s; t) =
m¡iX
k=1
[®0P k¡i(s; t+ 1)] ¢ ¼i(sji ; sk¡i) + (1¡ ®0) ¢ P k¡i(a; t+ 1)(4)








For a given player i, the likelihood function of observing a choice history
of fsi(1); si(2); : : : ; si(T ¡ 1); si(T )g is given by:
® ¢ [¦Tt=1P si(t)i (s; t)] + (1¡ ®) ¢ [¦Tt=1P si(t)i (a; t)] (6)
The proposed model passes a form of the \publishability test" articulated
by McKelvey and Riddough [45].They argue that a good social science the-
ory should still apply even after it is \published" or widely-understood; or
if behavior changes after publication, the theory should contain an explana-
tion for why change occurs. Our model passes this test if only sophisticated
players can \read", since sophisticated players will not change their behav-
ior as long as adaptive learners remain unsophisticated. The only theory
which passes full-readability test is when ® = 1 (® < 1 corresponds to
`limited circulation' or `illiterates'.)
Because the model assumes that sophisticated players think others are
sophisticated (and those others think others are sophisticated...), it creates
a whirlpool of recursive thinking which nests equilibrium concepts. Quan-
tal response equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey [43], [44], Chen, Friedman
and Thisse [15]; c.f. Rosenthal [57]) is equivalent to everyone being sophisti-
cated (® = 1) and the sophisticated players having rational expectations or
\social calibration" about the proportion of sophisticates (® = ®0). (Nash
equilibrium, which we prefer to call `hyper-responsive QRE', is just ® = ®0
along with in¯nite responsive sensitivity ¸.) Weizsacker [74] allows players
to have one response sensitivity, but think that other players' sensitivi-
ties are di®erent (typically, lower) and ¯nds that allowing this di®erence
improves accuracy in explaining data from one-shot normal-form games.
Our parameterization emphasizes that QRE consists of the conjunction
of two separate modeling assumptions: Players are sophisticated (®=1)
11This speci¯cation assumes that sophisticated players' and the modeler's forecasts
of the adaptive players are identical. A more general speci¯cation can allow them to be
di®erent.
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and sophisticated players are socially calibrated (® = ®0). The two as-
sumptions can be evaluated separately (and our model do so). Including
both ® and ®0 allows for two (opposite) kinds of judgment biases in assess-
ing relative sophistication: Sophisticated subjects could underestimate the
number of subjects who are sophisticated like themselves (®0 < ®, \false
uniqueness" or overcon¯dence about relative sophistication), or could over-
estimate the number of sophisticates (®0 > ®, \false consensus" or \curse
of knowledge").
Many studies document various types of optimism, overcon¯dence, or
\false uniqueness" . For example, most people say they are above average
on good traits and below average on bad traits. Most studies simply use
self-reports and do not pay people according to their actual ranking, but
a few studies have used experimental economics methods, which include
¯nancial incentive for accuracy and a clear de¯nition of trait and rank,
and replicate the basic ¯nding. Applied to the sophisticated EWA model,
overcon¯dence about relative sophistication would imply that sophisticates
think there are fewer people as \smart" as themselves than there actually
are, so ®0 < ®. This kind of overcon¯dence is built into \level-k types"
models like those of Stahl and Wilson [69]) (see also Costa-Gomes, Craw-
ford, and Broseta [19], Ho et al. [32]). In those models, level 0 players
choose randomly and level k + 1 players best-respond to behavior of level
k players. In a sense, this structure means players at every level think that
nobody is as smart as them, and that everybody else is one level below. In
our model, setting ®0 = 0 corresponds to a level 1 learning type.
The opposite mistake is called \false consensus": People overestimate
how much like themselves other people are.12 A related e®ect is the inability
of people who have learned new information to imagine what not knowing
the information is like, the \curse of knowledge".13 In sophisticated EWA
a false consensus bias would imply that sophisticated people overestimate
how many others are sophisticated, so that ®0 > ®.
3.2. Dominance-solvable p-beauty contest games
We estimate the sophisticated WA model using data of the p-beauty con-
tests collected by Ho et al. [32]). In a p-beauty contest game, n players
12The term \false consensus" is a misnomer because a `rational bias' of this sort will
result if people use their own behavior or tastes as a sample of tastes and update their
beliefs about population tastes. The e®ect is correctly de¯ned as overweighting your
own tastes relative to information about the tastes of others. Engelmann and Strobel
[23] show that there is no such bias when it is de¯ned this way and information about
other people is presented, along with ¯nancial incentives for accuracy.
13An example of false consensus is due to George Wu. He asked his students whether
they had cell phones, and also asked them to estimate what fraction of students in the
class had cell phones. Students with cell phones thought 55% had them, and those
without cell phones thought only 35% had them.
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simultaneously choose numbers xi in some interval, say [0,100]. The aver-




n is computed, which establishes a target
number, ¿ , equal to p ¢ ¹x. The player whose number is closest to the target
wins a ¯xed prize n ¢ ¼ (and ties are broken randomly14).
P -beauty contest games were ¯rst studied experimentally by Nagel [49]
and extended by Du®y and Nagel [21] and Ho et al. [32]). These games
are useful for estimating the number of steps of iterated dominance players
use in reasoning through games. To illustrate, suppose p = :7. Since the
target can never be above 70, any number choice above 70 is stochastically
dominated by simply picking 70. Similarly, players who obey dominance,
and believe others do too, will pick numbers below 49 so choices in the
interval (49; 100] violate the conjunction of dominance and one step of
iterated dominance. The unique Nash equilibrium is 0.
There are two behavioral regularities in beauty contest games (see Nagel
[50]). First, initial choices are widely dispersed and centered somewhere
between the interval midpoint and the equilibrium. This basic result has
been replicated with students on three continents and with several samples
of sophisticated adults, including economics Ph.D.'s and a sample of CEOs
and corporate presidents (see Camerer [7]). Second, when the game is
repeated, numbers gradually converge toward the equilibrium.
Explaining beauty contest convergence is surprisingly di±cult for adap-
tive learning models. Choice reinforcement converges far too slowly, be-
cause only one player wins each period and the losers get no reinforce-
ment. Belief models with low values of Á, which update beliefs very quickly,
may track the learning process reasonably well, but earlier work suggests
Cournot dynamics are not fast enough either (Ho et al. [32]).
The sophisticated EWA model was estimated on a subsample of data
collected by Ho et al. [32]. Subjects were 196 undergraduate students in
computer science and engineering in Singapore. Each seven-person group of
players played 10 times together twice, with di®erent values of p in the two
10-period sequences. (One sequence used p > 1 and is not included below.)
The prize was .5 Singapore dollars per player each time, about $2.33 per
group for seven-person groups. They were publicly told the target number
¿ and privately told their own payo® (i.e., whether they were closest or
not).
We analyze a subsample of their data with p = :7 and :9, from groups
of size 7. This subsample combines groups in a `high experience' condition
(the game is the second one subjects play, following a game with a value of
p > 1) and the `low experience' condition (the game is the ¯rst they play).




where I(x; y) is the indicator func-
tion that equals one if x = y and 0 otherwise.
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Several design choices were necessary to implement the model. The sub-
jects chose integers in the interval [0,100], a total of 101 strategies. If
we allow 101 possible values of Aj(0) we quickly use too many degrees of
freedom estimating the initial attractions. Rather than imposing too many
structural requirements on the distribution of Aj(0), we use the ¯rst-period
data to initialize attractions.
Denote the empirically observed frequency of strategy j in the ¯rst period





j ; j = 1; : : : ;m: (7)
(This is equivalent to choosing initial attractions to maximize the likeli-
hood of the ¯rst-period data, separately from the rest of the data, for a
value of ¸ derived from the overall likelihood-maximization.) Some algebra








ln( ~f j); j = 1; : : : ;m (8)





is a measure of relative frequency of strategy j. We
¯x the strategy j with the lowest frequency to have Aj(0) = 0 (which is
necessary for identi¯cation) and solve for the other attractions as a function
of ¸ and the frequencies ~f j .
Since the subjects who did not win did not know the winning num-
ber, they could not precisely compute foregone payo®s. Therefore, we
assume they have a simple uniform belief over a range of possible win-
ning numbers.15 We assume the losers reinforce numbers in the interval
[¿ ¡ ±¢n¢¼d ; ¿ + ±¢n¢¼d ]. The amount of reinforcement is of a triangular form
with the maximum of ± times the prize at the target number and decreases
linearly at a slope of d (which is a parameter to be estimated). Denote
the winning number to be w and the distance between the target and the
winning number by e = j¿¡wj. Winners reinforce numbers in the intervals
(¿ ¡ e; ¿ + e) by ± times the prize. Winners reinforce the boundary number
they choose, either ¿ ¡ e or ¿ + e, by the prize divided by the number of
winners, and reinforce the other boundary number by ± times the prize
divided by the number of winners. If there is only one winner, she also re-
inforce numbers in the intervals (¿¡e; ¿¡e¡ ±¢n¢¼d ) and (¿+e; ¿+e+ ±¢n¢¼d )
by a reinforcement of a triangular form with the maximum of ± times the
15In Camerer and Ho [8], we assume that subjects know the winning number. Assum-
ing subjects having a belief over the possible winning numbers provides a signi¯cantly
better ¯t for the observed data.
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prize at ¿ ¡ e and ¿ + e and decreases linearly at a slope of d with smaller
and larger number respectively.
Table 2 reports the results and the parameter estimates.16 For inexperi-
enced subjects, adaptive EWA generates Cournot-like estimates (Á^ = ½^ = 0
and ±^ = :90). Adding sophistication increases Á^ and improves LL by 59.77
in-sample and 24.23 out-of-sample. The estimated fraction of sophisticated
players is .24 and their estimated perception ®^0 is zero. The important con-
sideration parameter ± is estimated to be .78 in the sophisticated model.
Experienced subjects show a large increase in sophistication. The esti-
mated proportion of sophisticates, and their perceptions, are .77 and .41.
Consequently, adaptive EWA ¯ts much worse than sophisticated EWA, a
di®erence in LL of 220.40 and 214.81 in- and out-of-sample. (In absolute
LL terms, it also ¯ts inexperienced and experienced subject data about
equally well.) The increase in sophistication due to experience re°ects
a kind of \cross-period" learning which is similar to rule learning (Stahl
[67]) or \rule switching" (Salmon [61]). The di®erence is that in Salmon
and Stahl's approaches, players either keep track of actual or prospec-
tive performance of di®erent rules, and switch in the direction of better-
performing rules (Stahl [67]) or switch away from poorly-performing rules
(Gale, Binmore and Samuelson [27], Salmon [61]). In our current speci¯-
cation, this change in rules can only occur between games, but it could be
easily adapted to allow within-session rule changes (see Camerer and Ho
[8]).
Figures 2a and 3a show the actual choice frequencies for inexperienced
and experienced subjects, respectively. Experienced subjects actually start
by choosing somewhat higher numbers (perhaps due to \negative transfer"
from their earlier experience17, but converge more rapidly.) By round 4
nearly half the experienced subjects choose numbers 1-10 (the large spikes
on the back and left of Figure 3a). By contrast, it takes inexperienced
subjects nine rounds for a third of them to choose 11-20. The fact that ex-
perienced subjects start farther from equilibrium, and end up much closer,
16We generate standard error for the parameter estimates using bootstrapping ap-
proach. 200 sets of bootstrapped estimates are produced using maximum likelihood
estimation. Each set of bootstrapped estimates is derived from a weighted likelihood
with randomly generated weights. One random weight is associated with each round
of game. The random weights are non-negative integers generated such that their sum
is equal to total rounds of games used in calibration (i.e. 8*number of sequences in
in-sample calibration). For each parameter, we sort the 200 bootstrapped estimates and
note the 2.5 and 97.5 percentile estimates (i.e. the 6th and the 295th estimates). We
take the di®erence between these two estimates to be 3.92 standard errors.
17Experienced subjects had previously participated in a p > 1 beauty contest, in
which choices converged to 200. This experience seemed to have a hysteresis e®ect on
¯rst-period choices.
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is an indication that subjects are learning more rapidly, and more sophis-
ticatedly (i.e., anticipating learning by others).
Figures 2b-c show the frequencies predicted by the adaptive EWA (2b)
and sophisticated EWA (2c) models, for inexperienced subjects. Both mod-
els ¯t the general patterns in the data fairly well. Keep in mind that if the
model over¯ts in periods 2-7, it would predict particularly badly in the out-
of-sample periods 8-10, but it does not. The di®erence between Figures 2b
and 2c shows that adding sophistication is only a small visual improvement
(consistent with the modest increase in LL). The only noticeable improve-
ment is that the largest spikes are higher in the sophisticated analysis, and
closer to the data.
Figures 3b-c show the frequencies predicted by the adaptive EWA (3b)
and sophisticated EWA (3c) models, for experienced subjects. Here there is
a substantial improvement from including sophistication (compare 3c with
3b and 3a), which appears to ¯t nicely.
Restrictions of the sophisticated model generally degrade ¯t and predic-
tive accuracy a lot. Imposing ®0 = ® = 1 creates quantal-response equilib-
rium, which is 376.18 and 232.97 worse in LL for inexperienced and expe-
rienced subjects. One way for QRE to capture learning in a very reduced
form is to allow the response sensitivity ¸ to vary over time. Allowing this
does produce increasing values of ¸ (reported in Table 2), but the di®erence
in in- sample LL is still very large, 365.19 and 165.77.18 We suspect that
the problem with QRE in these games is that the data are multi-modal,
with \spikes" re°ecting discrete levels of reasoning. (For example, in the
very large samples from newspaper games with p = 2=3, there are sharp
spikes at 33 and 22, re°ecting one or two steps of iterated reasoning from
a perceived mean of 50.) QRE will never produce spikes of this type and
hence, will ¯t the central tendencies of the data, and track its movement
toward Nash equilibrium over time, but will miss the multimodality. A
QRE model in which di®erent players have di®erent values of ¸ can gener-
ate multimodality and will probably ¯t better, particularly in dominance-
solvable games (in which increasing ¸ will correspond statistically to levels
of iterated reasoning; cf. Goeree and Holt [29]).
18Our procedure of estimating the model in-sample and ¯xing parameter values to
forecast out-of- sample makes life di±cult for the varying-¸ QRE model, since we ¯x
¸ at the last (period 7) estimate to forecast periods 8-10. A better procedure would
impose some increasing functional structure on the ¸(t) function so that ¸ would con-
tinue to increase in the out-of-sample periods. Note, however, that the in-sample LL
is substantially worse than sophisticated EWA for inexperienced subjects, and slightly
worse with experienced subjects.
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We did not estimate simple choice reinforcement models on these data
because they do an awful job. Only one of seven players receives any
reinforcement each period, so learning is far too slow.19
Cournot-like belief models will ¯t better; indeed, for both groups of sub-
jects the EWA estimate of ±^ is quite close to one and Á is low. However, as
noted above, sophisticated EWA improves substantially on adaptive EWA,
so even if adaptive EWA corresponds to belief learning, adding sophistica-
tion improves upon it.
We also estimated the rational expectations (RE, ® = ®0) and egocentric
bias or level-type (®0 = 0) restrictions on estimated and perceived sophis-
tication. For inexperienced subjects, the losses in log likelihood relative
to sophisticated EWA are 3.63 and 2.85 for RE, in- and out- of-sample,
and 21.24 and .16 for egocentric bias. For experienced subjects the analo-
gous ¯gures are 10.78 and 62.43 for RE, and 14.29 and 13.50 for egocentric
bias.20 While these di®erences in LL are modest, both restrictions can be
rejected (particularly RE), which shows the predictive appeal of a model
that separates sophistication and perceived sophistication, without impos-
ing the strict level structure. In addition, the gap between ® and ®0 grows
with experience, from 24% to 34% (and the RE restriction is rejected much
more strongly for experienced subjects). It seems that while players get
more sophisticated between sessions, they also overestimate how many oth-
ers become sophisticated.
A ¯nal observation provides an ideal segue to the next section of this pa-
per. In the actual frequency plots Figures 2a and 3a, the curious eye can't
help but notice the small number of very large choices (typically 100), par-
ticularly in later rounds. In Ho et al. [32], we called these \spoilers" and
tested several explanations for why people might choose such high num-
bers. The most likely possibility is that subjects believe others are learning
according to some adaptive rule that responds to the previous mean. By
choosing a large number in round t, they throw adaptive learners o® the
trail, causing the adaptive learners to choose arti¯cially high numbers in
round t+1, which improves their chance of winning by choosing a low num-
ber. This kind of behavior combines two ingredients: A belief that others
are learning adaptively; and a willingness to sacri¯ce period t pro¯ts (since
picking 100 essentially guarantees a loss) for the sake of increased future
pro¯ts, due to the way adaptive learners have been \taught" to behave.
This is a ¯rst glimpse of strategic teaching.
19This is a general problem for choice reinforcement models in games where n ¡ 1
players earn nothing, such as auctions, winner-take-all tournaments, market games with
one seller and many buyers (or vice versa), and so forth.
20Imposing these restrictions does not change other parameter estimates much, except
to increase ±^ to one for the egocentric restriction in both inexperienced and experienced
subject samples.
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4. STRATEGIC TEACHING
For a sophisticated player who anticipates that other players will learn,
it is natural to take into account the e®ect of her period t action on the
adaptive players' period t+1 actions, because those actions will change the
sophisticated player's period t+1 payo®s. We call the behavior which max-
imizes discounted expected payo®s, taking into account the e®ect of one's
own current behavior on future behavior of others, \strategic teaching".
The basic idea is described by Fudenberg and Levine [26] (pp. 261-263;
cf. Ellison [22]). They write:
...imagine that one player is myopic and follows the type of learning proce-
dure we have discussed in this book, while another player is sophisticated
and has a reasonably good understanding that his opponent is using a
learning procedure of this type. What happens in this case?... [much as]
the results on equilibrium learning carry over to the case of nonequilibrium
learning, so we expect that the lessons of the literature on reputation will
carry over also to the case of nonequilibrium learning.
Fudenberg and Levine [25] showed that a very patient strategic teacher can
get almost as much utility as from the Stackelberg equilibrium, by playing
an optimal precommitment strategy forever (and waiting for the adaptive
player to come around to best-responding). In their book they add (p. 262)
that \the basic argument carries over in a straightforward way to the case
of nonequilibrium learning" (cf. Watson [72], Watson and Battigali [73]).
Strategic teaching extends the reach of the EWA model to incorporate
two important phenomena, which are beyond the grasp of standard adap-
tive models: (1) The in°uence of ¯xed-matching versus re-pairing protocols,
and (2) emergence of repeated-game behavior including, importantly, repu-
tation formation without cumbersome updating of \types" (a la Harsanyi).
If some players are capable of strategic teaching, then the way in which
players are matched, and feedback they are given, should make a di®erence
for learning. In fact, there is evidence that ¯xed-pair matching and ran-
dom rematching produce di®erent behaviors, which shows indirectly the
likely in°uence of strategic teaching. For example, Andreoni and Miller
[3] show that there is more mutual cooperation in ¯nitely-repeated prison-
ers' dilemma games when subjects play repeatedly with a ¯xed \partner"
than when they are re-paired with \strangers" in each period. Van Huyck,
Battalio and Beil [71] found a similar phenomenon in two-player \weak-
link games" (which are stag hunt or assurance games with seven strategies
rather than two). They compared partner pairings with stranger re-pairing.
The distributions of choices in the ¯rst period of the two pairing conditions
were similar, but partner pairs were able to converge to the e±cient equi-
librium reliably (10 of 12 did so) while the stranger re-pairing behavior
did not. Clark and Sefton [17] reported a similar result. It appears that
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subjects who make e±cient choices in the partner pairings, and see their
partner choose an ine±cient number in the ¯rst period, are inclined to
\patiently" make an e±cient choice once or twice more, as if holding their
behavior steady and anticipating that the other player will learn to play
e±ciently.21
These stylized facts are consistent with strategic teaching. Strategic
teachers who are matched with a di®erent partner each time cannot use
their current choices to in°uence what will happen in the future (to their
bene¯t) if their future partners do not know the teachers' history of choices
and anticipate similar choices in the future. Standard adaptive learning
models do not directly predict di®erences across matching protocols.
Introducing teaching allows the possibility that repeated-game behavior
is di®erent than simply repeating stage-game behavior. Of course, in the-
ory strategies which are not equilibrium strategies in a stage game can be
used in repeated-game equilibria (by the threat of reversion to a Pareto-
ine±cient equilibrium if a defection occurs), as the \folk theorem" of re-
peated games would suggest. A familiar example is the repeated-PD, in
which playing tit-for-tat is a repeated-game equilibrium (if the discount
factor is large enough, relative to payo®s), supported by the threat of re-
version to mutual defection, which is less pro¯table. This kind of dynamic
is precisely what teaching can explain: A strategic teacher may play a
strategy which is not myopically optimal (such as cooperating in a PD) in
the hope that it induces adaptive players to expect that strategy in the
future, which triggers a best-response that bene¯ts the teacher. Further-
more, reversion to the Pareto-ine±cient equilibrium is credible because the
teacher knows that if she defects, her adaptive opponent will learn to quit
playing the repeated-game strategy.
Strategic teaching is a di®erent way to comprehend repeated-game equi-
libria than standard analyses, and might prove better as a way of explaining
actual behavior. Consider the in°uence of the length of the horizon of fu-
ture play. In standard (pre-1980) theory, folk theorem results unravel when
the horizon of the repeated game is ¯nite. Standard theory therefore can-
not easily explain why players cooperate in say, the ¯rst 22 periods of a
25-period repeated PD, as is typically observed in experiments (e.g., Selten
21The same di®erence in partner and stranger matching does not seem to be present
in three-player groups (see Knez and Camerer [38]). We conjecture that the di®erence
in two¡ and three¡player dynamics can be traced to strategic teaching. In both cases,
the success of a strategic teacher who makes the e±cient choice repeatedly depends
on behavior of the \least teachable" player. Since there are two other players being
taught in the three-player game, and only one in the two-player game, strategic teachers
are more likely to give up and converge toward ine±ciency in three-player games. The
same sort of dynamics might help explain the fact that collusion is more sustainable in
repeated pricing and quantity games when the number of players is small, and di±cult
to sustain when the number is large (e.g., Holt [34]).
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and Stoecker [65]). Since strategic teaching assumes that the learners are
adaptive, and do not use backward induction, strategic teaching will gen-
erally predict folk theorem-type results until a point near the end of the
¯nite horizon, when it no longer pays to teach because the end is too close.
Strategic teaching therefore does not predict unraveling in ¯nitely-repeated
games, which is consistent with most experimental data and everyday in-
tuition (and contrary to standard theory).
Of course, it is now well-known that repeated-game behavior can arise in
¯nite-horizon games when there are a small number of \irrational" types
(who essentially act like the horizon is unlimited), which creates an incen-
tive for rational players to behave as if the horizon is unlimited until near
the end (e.g., Kreps and Wilson [40]). However, specifying why some types
are irrational, and how many they are, makes this interpretation di±cult
to test.22 In the teaching approach, the \crazy" type the teacher wants to
pretend to be arises endogenously from the payo® structure{ they are gen-
erally Stackelberg types, who play the strategy they would choose if they
could commit to it. (Teaching substitutes for \true" commitment.) In trust
games, they would like to commit to behaving nicely; in entry-deterrence,
they would like to commit to ¯ghting entry.
4.1. The Model
To illustrate the details of how teaching works, consider the repeated trust
game. (Below, we estimate the teaching model on a sample of experimental
data for this game, from Camerer and Weigelt [14].) In the trust game,
there is an borrower B who want to borrow money from a number of lenders
denoted Li (i = 1; : : : ; N). A lender makes only a single lending decision
(either Loan or No Loan) and the borrower makes a string of N decisions
each of which, either (repay or default), is made after observing the lender's
decision.
In a typical experimental session, a group of subjects are randomly assigned
the role of borrower, or lender. For example, a group of 11 subjects may
be divided into a group of 3 borrowers and a group of 8 lenders. In a
single sequence, an borrower B is randomly chosen to play in an 8-round
supergame. Each lender Li(i = 1; : : : ; 8) plays in 1 of the 8 stage games in a
random order (which is unknown to the borrower). To study cross-sequence
learning, the entire supergame is repeated in a series of sequences.
Denote each sequence of game rounds by k and each game round by t.
Note that within the sequence of game rounds, there is a common borrower.
In a typical experimental session, there are about 81 sequences. The goal
22Some models allow the number and nature of irrational types to be a free parame-
ter, as in the \homemade prior" account of Camerer and Weigelt [14] and Palfrey and
Rosenthal [53], executed formally by McKelvey and Palfrey [42]. The agent-based QRE
model we use below incorporates this idea.
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is to specify the probabilities for both the borrower and the lender for each
of their actions, in each round of each sequence.
Recall that each lender plays only once, and each borrower plays in only
a third of the sequences. Yet they watch all the other plays, and clearly
respond to observed behavior of others. Therefore, we assume a kind of
\observational" learning; all lenders learn equally from what they observe.
While the common-learning assumption is a substantial departure from
other sorts of adaptive learning models, it is plausible and well-supported
by some experimental evidence (e.g., Du®y and Feltovich [20]) and is neces-
sary to explain what we see in these games.23 We assume that the lenders
are purely adaptive (because the matching scheme gives them no incen-
tive to teach) and the borrower may be sophisticated, and may also be a
strategic teacher.
An important twist in our model is that players are assumed to learn
about the attraction of a strategy in a current round in two separate ways:
They learn from previous rounds in a sequence; and from how the strategies
performed in the current round in previous sequences. For concreteness,
consider round 7 in sequence 14. A lender presumably sees what happened
in the previous 6 rounds, and learns about whether to loan from what
happened in those rounds. It is also plausible that the lender looks at
what happened in the 7th round of previous sequences 1-13, and learns
about whether she should loan in round 7 from those sequences.
We include both types of learning in the model for theoretical and empir-
ical reasons. The theoretical reason is that learning about a speci¯c round
across sequences is like repeated-stage-game learning across similar games;
where the \similar" games are identical rounds in previous sequences. This
sort of transfer has been explored by Stahl [67] and resembles the similarity-
based \spillover" of reinforcement from a chosen strategy to neighboring
strategies explored by Sarin and Vahid [59]. Empirically, we thought that
including cross-sequence learning was necessary to explain the data better.
After all, the reason why experimenters conduct a (long!) series of repeated
game sequences, rather than simply one, is presumably a prior belief that
learning required many repetitions of the entire sequence. This sort of
cross-sequence learning is precisely what our two-step learning process (to
be discussed below) allows. The strength of cross-sequence learning is pa-
rameterized by a single parameter ¿ . If that parameter is zero there is no
cross-sequence learning. So the data can tell us whether allowing cross-
sequence learning is helpful through the value of ¿ .
It is not clear how to integrate the two sorts of learning. Returning to
our example, the strategy Loan for a lender before period 7 of sequence
23That is, lenders in later rounds of a sequence clearly react to what happened in
earlier rounds, even though the earlier-round behavior did not a®ect their payo®s. To
explain this sort of behavior without observational learning is impossible.
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14 can be said to have two di®erent attractions - the attraction of Loan
after period 6, and the attraction of Loan after period 7 of sequence 13.
Simply averaging these attractions is an obvious, but ham¯sted, way to
include them both in a general learning process. Re°ecting a prior belief
that within-sequence learning is more important than cross-sequence learn-
ing, we elected to make updating attractions within a sequence the basic
operation, then include an extra step of partial updating using the average
payo® from previous sequences.
Let us specify the attraction of an adaptive lender at the end of sequence
k and round t for strategy j, AjL(a; k; t). The updating occurs in 2 steps.
The idea is to create an \interim" attraction for round t, BjL(a; k; t), based
on the attraction AjL(a; k; t ¡ 1) and payo® from the round t, then incor-
porate experience in round t + 1 from previous sequences, transforming
BjL(a; k; t) into a ¯nal attraction A
j
L(a; k; t).
² Step 1 (adaptive learning across rounds within a sequence):
BjL(a; k; t) =
Á ¢N(k; t¡ 1) ¢AjL(a; k; t¡ 1)
M(k; t)
+
(± + (1¡ ±) ¢ I(j; sL(k; t))) ¢ ¼L(j; sB(k; t))
M(k; t)
M(k; t) = Á(1¡ ·) ¢N(k; t¡ 1) + 1
² Step 2 (simulated learning in a coming round from previous sequences):
AjL(a; k; t) =
Á¿ ¢ BjL(a; k; t) ¢M(k; t) + ¿ ¢ ± ¢ ¼^jL(k; t+ 1)
N(k; t)
N(k; t) = [Á(1¡ ·)]¿ ¢M(k; t) + ¿
We assume that the learning about an upcoming round from previous se-
quences is driven by the average payo® in that round in previous sequences.
Formally, ¼^jL(k; t+ 1) =
Pk¡1
m=1 ¼L(j; sB(m; t+ 1))=(k ¡ 1).24 As usual, we
derive P jL(a; k; t+ 1) from A
j
L(a; k; t).
Next we specify learning by an adaptive borrower. The updating occurs
in 2 steps.
² Step 1 (adaptive learning across rounds within a sequence):
BjB(a; k; t) =
Á ¢N(k; t¡ 1) ¢AjB(a; k; t¡ 1)
M(k; t)
+
24We have also explored a speci¯cation in which only the payo® received in the previ-
ous sequence from a particular strategy is used. That is, ¼^jL(k; t+1) = ¼L(j; sB(k¡1; t+
1)). That speci¯cation is too \¯ckle" and ¯ts worse than the average-payo® speci¯cation.
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(± + (1¡ ±) ¢ I(j; sB(k; t))) ¢ ¼B(j; sL(k; t))
M(k; t)
M(k; t) = Á(1¡ ·) ¢N(k; t¡ 1) + 1
² Step 2 (simulated learning in a coming round from previous sequences):
AjB(a; k; t) =
Á¿ ¢ BjB(a; k; j) ¢M(k; t) + ¿ ¢ ± ¢ ¼^jB(k; t+ 1)
N(k; t)
N(k; t) = [Á(1¡ ·)]¿ ¢M(k; t) + ¿
As above, we assume that the learning from an upcoming round, from
previous sequences, is driven by the average payo® in that round in previous
sequences (¼^jB(k; t + 1) =
Pk¡1
m=1 ¼B(j; sL(m; t + 1))=(k ¡ 1)). We derive
P jB(a; k; t+ 1) from A
j
B(a; k; t).
Now we are ready to specify how a sophisticated borrower will behave.
A sophisticated borrower guesses how the lender learns, and adapts those
guesses to experience, and also plans actions for the remaining periods
within a game sequence. Speci¯cally, we assume a sophisticated borrower's
attractions are speci¯ed as follows:
















L (a; k; vjjv¡1 2 Jt+1) ¢ ¼B(jv 2 Jt+1; j0)g
where P^ j
0
L (a; k; vjjv¡1) = P^LoanL (a; k; v¡1jjv¡1)¢P j
0
L (a; k; vj(Loan; jv¡1))+
P^NoLoanL (a; k; v¡1jjv¡1) ¢P j
0
L (a; k; vj(NoLoan; jv¡1)). Jt+1 speci¯es a pos-
sible path of future actions by the sophisticated borrower from round t+ 1
until end of the game sequence. That is Jt+1 = fjt+1; jt+2; : : : ; jT¡1; jT g
and jt+1 = j. We search only paths of future actions that always have de-
fault following repay because the reverse behavior (repay following default)
generates less return; the latter kind of behavior has a smaller reputation
building e®ect on the lender's behavior. It is therefore in the sophisticated
borrower's interest to allocate repay to earlier rounds. As usual, we derive
P jB(s; k; t+ 1) from A
j
B(s; k; t) using a logit rule.
Note that if ² = 0, the player is sophisticated but myopic (she does not
take into account the future learning e®ects of current actions). If ² > 0,
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the sophisticated player is a teacher who takes into account the e®ects of
current actions on learned behavior of others.
As before, we can assume that a proportion ® of the borrowers are sophis-
ticated. Then the likelihood of observing the data is given by ¦k[(1¡ ®) ¢
¦tP
SB(t)
B (a; k; t) + ® ¢ ¦tPSB(t)B (s; k; t)].25
We estimate the model using repeated game trust data from Camerer
and Weigelt [14]. As in our earlier work, we use maximum likelihood es-
timation (MLE) to calibrate the model on about 70% of the sequences in
each experimental session, then forecast behavior in the remaining 30%
of the sequences. If the model ¯ts better in-sample by over¯tting, it will
perform surprisingly poorly out-of-sample.26
4.2. Repeated Trust Game
We ¯t the teaching model on experimental data on the repeated borrower-
lender trust game studied by Camerer and Weigelt [14], to see whether the
model can explain borrower teachers trying to reassure worried lenders by
paying back in early periods, to bene¯t both sides.
Table 3 shows payo®s in the repeated trust game. The lenders earn 10
if they do not lend; they earn 40 if a loan is repaid and lose -100 if the
borrower defaults.27 A normal borrower earns 10 if the lender does not
lend, 150 if the lender lends and she defaults, and earns only 60 if she pays
back. Honest-type borrower have default and repayment payo®s of 0 and
60 respectively (note that they earn more from repaying).
The probability that a borrower had honest-type payo®s in a particu-
lar sequence, P(Honest), was .33 (sessions 3-5), .10 (sessions 6-8) and 0
(sessions 9-10). Subjects were MBA students at NYU or University of
Pennsylvania. They were paid according to performance and earned an
average of $18 for a 2-1/2 hour session.
Each session had 70-101 eight-period sequences. In each session, there
were 11 subjects, three borrowers and eight lenders, in a ¯xed-role protocol.
In a given eight-period sequence, a single borrower faced eight di®erent
lenders. To inhibit two-sided reputation-building, the eight lenders played
in a di®erent random order in each sequence. To prevent borrowers from
25We assume rational expectation (i.e., ® = ®0) in the estimation of the teaching
model.
26We used GAUSS. To avoid settling into local maxima, we posited two or three
starting values for each parameter, and used 64 combinations of possible parameter
values as di®erent initial conditions. After 50 iterations from each initial condition, we
chose the best-¯tting estimates and continued iterating to convergence.
27Payo®s were varied for lenders for the loan-default outcome, -50 in sessions 6-8
and -75 in sessions 9-10. These parameter variations provide a small `stress test' for
whether the same structural model can account for behavior across sessions with minimal
parameter variation.
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treating consecutive sequences as a long cross-sequence supergame, the
lender chosen to play in sequence k + 1 was one of the two subjects who
did not participate in sequence k (i.e., lenders never played two sequences
in a row).
We now discuss the sequential equilibrium predictions, then return to the
data. With the payo®s used in Table 3, the analysis proceeds as follows:
Start from period 8. In this period, lenders know that the borrower will
play Default if she loans (and the honest type will, of course, repay) so the
only question is the probability that the borrower is a honest type. Simple
algebra shows that if lenders are risk-neutral, they should loan if P(Honest)
is above 55/70, about .79. De¯ne this important threshold to be °. In the
second-to-last period, period 7, normal borrowers are torn between two
forces: Conditional on loan, they would like to choose Default to earn the
higher payo®; but if they do so, they would have revealed their type and
would earn the No-Loan payo® in period 8. However, if their reputation
(i.e., the perception P(Honest) lenders have) in period 7 is below °, then
lenders will not loan and Bayesian updating would lead lenders to have the
same perception in period 8 which, by assumption, is too low to induce
the lenders to lend in period 8. The trick is for borrowers to play a mixed
strategy, repaying frequently enough that if they do default, the updated
P(Honest) will be just above °, so that lenders would loan in the last period.
Given a particular P(Honest) in period 7, the normal borrower should
choose a repayment probability p which keeps the lender indi®erent to
loan in period 7, and allows Bayesian updating of his reputation to the
threshold P(Honest)=° in period 8. Combining these two conditions gives
a threshold of perceived P(Honest) which happens to be °2, and a mixed
strategy probability of loan in period 7 of .560.
The same argument works by induction back to period 1. In each period
the lender has a threshold of perceived P(Honest) which makes her indif-
ferent to loan. The path of these P(Honest) values is simply °n. Figure
4 shows this path, and the mixed-strategy probabilities of paying back by
normal borrowers which keep the lender's perceptions along this path (for
an initial prior P(Honest) of .33). The Figure can be used to illustrate
all the key properties of this equilibrium.28 In the ¯rst three periods, the
threshold P(Honest) is below the prior of .33, so borrowers can \a®ord"
to always default and lenders should loan. Beginning in period 4, nor-
mal borrowers must mix in order to boost their reputation, conditional on
loan, to stay along the equilibrium path of P(Honest) which increases. If
28Characteristically, there are other sequential equilibria. For example, the normal
borrower might never repay, if she thinks that the lender will perceive Repay as an
indication of a normal type. The intuitive criterion selects the equilibrium we discuss
however, so we will casually refer to it as \the" equilibrium.
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the borrower ever defaults, the lender should not lend in all subsequent
periods.
Two patterns in the data are of primary interest. First, what is the rate
of loan across periods (and how does it change across sequences)? Second,
how do borrowers respond to loan in di®erent periods (and how do these
responses vary across sequences)?
Typical patterns in the data can be seen in Figures 5a-b. Figures 5a-
b are data from all sessions. The ¯gures show relative frequencies of No
Loan and Default (conditional on loan).29 Sequences are combined into ten-
sequence blocks (denoted \sequence") and average frequencies are reported
from those blocks. Periods 1,...,8 denote periods in each sequence.
Figure 5a-b show the data from all eight sessions pooled. Lenders start
by generally making loans (i.e., low frequency of no-loan) in early periods,
then learn to rarely loan in periods 7-8. Borrowers default infrequently
in early periods, but usually default in periods 7-8, and the pattern is
particularly dramatic in later sequences.
As a benchmark alternative to the teaching model, we estimated an
agent-based version of quantal response equilibrium suitable for extensive-
form games (see McKelvey and Palfrey [44]). An Appendix explains pre-
cisely how the the agent-QRE model is implemented and estimated.30 We
use this model, rather than sequential equilibrium, because the (intuitive)
sequential equilibrium predicts many events to have zero probability, so
some notion of error or trembling is needed to ¯t the data (otherwise the
logarithm of likelihood explodes). Agent-QRE is a plausible form and ¯ts
many data sets well (see McKelvey and Palfrey [44], Goeree and Holt [29]).
We implement the model with four parameters { the prior belief of lenders
about P(Honest) (which can di®er from the prior induced by the experi-
mental design to re°ect \homemade priors"), and di®erent response sensi-
tivities ¸ for lenders, honest borrowers, and normal borrowers. Agent-QRE
is a good benchmark because it incorporates the key features of repeated-
game equilibrium { (stochastic) optimization, accurate expectations about
actions of other players, and Bayesian updating. Also, while it makes the
same conditional predictions in every sequence, it can explain di®erences
across sequences if early-period play changes across an experimental ses-
sion. AQRE therefore presents a sti® challenge to any adaptive learning
model which tries to explain learning both within and across sequences.
29To distinguish cases in which there are no data from true zeros (e.g., no repay after
several loans), we plot cases with no data as -.1.
30We use an agent-based form in which players choose a distribution of strategies at
each node, rather than using a distribution over all history-dependent strategies.
STRATEGIC TEACHING 29
Table 5 gives parameter estimates for each of the 8 sessions, estimated
separately to gauge cross-session stability. Table 4 shows measures of ¯t.31
To measure ¯t we report both log likelihood and the average predicted
probability of events that occurred. Table 4 shows that for the in-sample
calibration, the average predicted probabilities range from 59% to 83%
for the teaching model, compared to 54% to 82% for agent-QRE, and the
teaching model ¯ts better in every session. Of course, an important test for
over¯tting is how badly performance degrades in out-of-sample forecasting.
The average probabilities fall by only 0.25% on average for the teaching
model, and range from 59% to 86%. The agent-QRE model has average
probabilities range from 54% to 85% and always ¯ts worse than the teaching
model by this measure. The log likelihood measure yields a similar result:
The teaching model beats agent-QRE in all but one session.
Table 5 shows parameter values (and standard errors) for the teaching
model. The interesting lender parameters are ± and ¿ . The weights on
foregone payo®, ± range from .18 to .65, and average .43, with low standard
errors (generally less than .10). Estimates of ¿ range from .88 to 1.00,
except for one outlier at .51, which indicates a high degree of cross-sequence
learning.
The interesting parameters for sophisticated borrowers are ® and ². The
degree of sophistication ® ranges from .03 to .99. The \horizon" parameter
² is close to one in ¯ve sessions and around .20 in three sessions.32
An important test of the agent-QRE model is whether the estimated per-
ceived P(Honest) is reasonably correlated with the induced prior P(Honest)
across sessions. The estimated priors in the eight sessions are .54, .19, .07,
.42, .41, .50, .00 and .00 (these estimates are precise: standard errors are no
larger than .004). The correlation of these estimates and the induced pri-
ors across the eight sessions is only .23. This suggests that the agent QRE
model is not capturing a behavioral process in which the induced prior plus
some stable behavioral disposition toward always repaying explains what
players are doing.
Figures 5c-d show that the teaching model captures most of the key
regularities in the data, although it does not always ¯t aggressive patterns
in the data. No-loan frequencies are predicted to start low and rise across
periods, as they do. There are some slight downward trends over time (e.g.,
periods 1-4) in the data, which the model captures in periods 2-4. Since
the model is forecasting out-of-sample in sequence blocks 7-9, its ability to
forecast those trends in those sequences is particularly noteworthy. Notice
that the no-loan rate pops up quite a bit in periods 3-5 in those later
31To simplify reporting, we report only the key parameter estimates (Á; ±; ½; ¿; ®; ²).
The remaining parameter estimates are available from the authors upon request.
32Two of the three sessions with low ²^ are sessions with a zero-prior on the honest
type, where reputation-building is less common.
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sequences, and the model predicts an increase as well. There is less change
in the default rate across sequences for the model to capture. It does not
pick up the drop in default rate in early periods across sequences well, but
it does predict the rate of increase in default rate across periods reasonably
well, except for underpredicting reneging in the last period.
4.3. Distinguishing strategic teaching from type-based
reputation formation
Strategic teaching generates behavior which is similar to reputation-
building in repeated games where there is Bayesian updating of players'
unobserved \types". In the type-based models the presence of honest types
who prefer to repay creates an incentive (depending on payo®s and the prior
P(Honest)) for types with normal payo®s to repay loans.
Many of the predictions of the teaching and type-based models across
periods and changes in payo®s are similar. The crucial di®erence is that in
the type-based models a particular player has a reputation (i.e., a poste-
rior P(Honest) and associated probabilities of repayment in each period).
In the teaching model a strategy has a \reputation" or attraction. More
precisely, there are four important di®erences between the teaching and
types approaches: Sensitivity to priors, independence of own payo®s and
own mixture probabilities, the e®ect of missed opportunity, and \no sec-
ond chances". We sketch these di®erences here and plan to explore them
further in future work.
Type-based models have the following properties: If the prior P(Honest)
is below some threshold (depending on payo®s and the horizon of the
¯nitely-repeated game) there is no reputation-building; mixture probabil-
ities depend only on the other players' payo®s; if a borrower does not
receive a loan in an early period that missed opportunity does not a®ect
future behavior, but if a borrower does not receive a loan in a later period
(and hence has no chance to repay and build reputation) then she never
receives any more loans; and the sensible sequential equilibrium requires
the assumption that if a borrower defaults in one period, then repays in
a subsequent period, her reputation is not restored (there are \no second
chances"). The teaching model does not make these same predictions.
When the type-based models are extended to include quantal-response and
a \homemade prior", as in the AQRE model we used as a static bench-
mark, the sensitivity to priors and independence properties no longer hold,
but the missed-opportunity and no-second-chances properties still hold (in
a probabilistic sense).
There is a simple experimental way to discriminate between the teach-
ing and type-based approaches. The type-based approach requires that
a player's type remain ¯xed throughout a sequence. If types are drawn
randomly in each period, the link between past behavior, inferences about
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types, and future incentives is broken and there is no equilibrium reputation-
building by normal types. In the teaching approach the presence of nice
types does matter33 but it makes little di®erence whether a player's type is
¯xed within a sequence or drawn independently in each period. Comparing
behavior in experiments with ¯xed types and independent types therefore
provides a way to distinguish the type-based and teaching approaches. The
type-based approach predicts a big di®erence in behavior across those two
protocols, while the teaching approach predicts little di®erence.
We do not suggest that the teaching approach should completely replace
type- based equilibrium models of reputation-formation. However, it has
always seemed dubious that players are capable of the delicate balance of
reasoning required to implement the type-based models, unless they learn
the equilibrium through some adaptive process. The teaching model is
the only available model of that process, and is therefore worth explor-
ing further. Note also that the type-based models assume optimization
and foresight by reputation- builders, and Bayesian updating of types by
\learners". The teaching model only changes the last feature, replacing
Bayesian updating by learners with learning about their strategies. Our
adaptive EWA work showed that some Bayesian learning models which are
used to compute expected payo®s (weighted ¯ctitious play) can be perfectly
operationalized by generalized reinforcement which keeps track of histor-
ical payo®s. In a similar way, assuming that entrants update strategy
attractions may be a sensible empirical alternative to Bayesian updating of
types, and softens the sharp predictions which result from that approach
(particularly the missed opportunity and no-second-chance features).
5. CONCLUSION
This paper extends earlier work on adaptive EWA learning to include
sophistication and strategic teaching. Before proceeding to summarize our
conclusions, it is helpful to think of the properties one would like an empir-
ical model to have. (i) The model should use all the information that sub-
jects have, if the subjects use that information. (Reinforcement and belief
models don't have this property; see Salmon [61].) (ii) The parameters of
the model should have psychological interpretations, preferably consistent
with accepted ideas in neighboring social sciences. (iii) The model should
be as simple as possible, in the sense that every parameter should play
a distinct role that is predictively useful. (iv) The model should ¯t well,
both in- and out-of-sample, judging by statistical criteria which, preferably,
permit model comparison.
33Presence of honest types matters because they alter the attractions of loan and
no-loan strategies for lenders, and hence alter the marginal incentives to teach.
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EWA does well on all four of these criteria. An important ¯fth property
is that a model be tractable enough to explore its theoretical implications.
Heller and Sarin [30] have made initial progress, using a variant of EWA,
which is promising. In current work, we have endogenized EWA parame-
ters, making them functions of experience (Ho et al. [31]). Our method
opens the door to easier theorizing.34
However, adaptive EWA is incomplete by the information-use (i) and
psychological ¯delity criteria (ii), because it does explain how players' in-
formation about the payo®s of others is used, and it does not allow the
sort of anticipatory learning which is plausible for intelligent experienced
players. Therefore, we extended the model by assuming some fraction ®
of players are sophisticated in a speci¯c sense: They believe others adapt
according to EWA, but also believe that a fraction ®0 are sophisticated like
themselves.
We estimate the sophisticated EWA model on a sample of data from
dominance- solvable `p-beauty contest' games. In these games, each of the
n players choose a number from the interval [0,100] and the player whose
number is closest to p times the average number wins a ¯xed prize. We
chose these games because there is substantial learning evident in the data,
but the adaptive EWA model (and the special cases of reinforcement and
weighted ¯ctitious play) ¯t miserably (see Camerer and Ho [10]).35
Introducing sophistication improves ¯t substantially. More interestingly,
we ¯nd that the estimated fraction of sophisticated players, ®, rises sub-
stantially between sessions with inexperienced subjects and those with ex-
perienced subjects (who play a second p-beauty contest with a di®erent
value of p). This shows that what experience creates is not just learn-
ing about the success of strategies, but also learning about learning{ or
increasing sophistication. Players seem to learn that others are adaptive,
and learn to \jump ahead" by anticipating changes by others.36
Once sophistication is introduced, whether players will be matched to-
gether repeatedly or not could matter. Sophisticated players who under-
stand that others are learning will have an incentive to take actions in
period t, which \teach" adaptive players how strategies perform, so the
sophisticated can earn a higher payo® in period t+ 1 and beyond. (If play-
34Speci¯cally, in the one-parameter \EWA Lite" of Ho et al. [31], when an opponent's
behavior stabilize the parameters Á and ± both converge toward one, which means the
learning rule converges toward ¯ctitious play (if · = 0). When another player's be-
havior stabilizes we can therefore apply convergence theorems which are used to show
convergence of ¯ctitious play in some settings (see Fudenberg and Levine [25]).
35Reinforcement ¯ts particularly badly becauseN¡1 players receive no reinforcement,
if they do not win, and yet they appear to learn. This poor ¯t highlights a well-known
limit of reinforcement learning{ in many-person games where many players earn no
payo®, reinforcement learns far too slowly (see Roth and Erev [58] on market games).
36A similar point is made, with quite a di®erent model, by Stahl [66]).
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ers are rematched in each period, then this kind of teaching motivation
disappears.)
Strategic teaching captures the incentive players have, in repeated games
with ¯xed partners, to implement repeated-game strategies which can lead
to results that are not stage-game equilibria. We explore this possibility
in borrower-lender trust games. In the trust game, borrowers have an
incentive to repay loans in early periods, in order to obtain further loans,
but toward the end of the eight-period horizon they should quit repaying.
We show that a model with adaptive lenders, and sophisticated borrowers
who \strategically teach", can explain the basic patterns in these data
reasonably well (and consistently better than agent-based quantal response
equilibrium).
The teaching approach shows promise for capturing much of the intuition
and empirical regularity of reputation- building in repeated games, with-
out using the type-based equilibrium approach. The device of assuming
updated types is useful for explaining why lenders are afraid to loan early,
and willing to loan late. Sophisticated EWA with strategic teaching pro-
duces the same e®ect more directly{ borrowers have an incentive to repay
early because they know that lenders will be convinced, not because they
believe the borrower's reputations per se, but simply because they learn
that loaning in early periods is good.
The teaching model helps resolve a mystery in the experimental literature
on repeated games. Basic patterns in the data do go in the direction
predicted by sequential equilibrium{ viz., borrowers repay more often in
early periods of a sequence, and lenders seem to anticipate or learn this,
loan more frequently in earlier periods. But changes in treatment variables
do not always create predicted changes in behavior (see Neral and Ochs
[51] and Jung, Kagel and Levin [37]), subtle predictions of the equilibrium
theory are not con¯rmed, and equilibrium calculations are so complex that
it is hard to believe subjects are calculating rather than learning. As a
result, Camerer and Weigelt [14] concluded their paper as follows:
...the long period of disequilibrium behavior early in these experiments
raises the important question of how people learn to play complicated
games. The data could be ¯t to statistical learning models, though new
experiments or new models might be needed to explain learning adequately.
(pp 27-28).
Strategic teaching is one possible answer to the question they raised almost
15 years ago.
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APPENDIX: THE AGENT-QRE MODEL
This appendix describes how we estimate an agent-QRE model on the
trust data. Recall that the lender's payo® structure is: No Loan = 10;
Loan, Repay = 40, and Loan, Default = -100. The normal borrower's
payo® structure is: No Loan = 10, Loan, Repay = 60, Loan, Default =
150. The honest borrower's payo® structure is: No Loan = 10, Loan,
Repay = 60, and Loan, Default = 0. We index the game periods by t. We
denote the behavioral strategies as follows: PL(t) is the probability that
lender will loan, PD(t) is the probability that the normal borrower will
repay, and PH(t) is the probability that the honest borrower will repay in
period t. Denote the lender's belief that the borrower is honest at time t
by qt. There are 4 parameters to be estimated: the response sensitivity
parameters ®L; ®D; ®H as well as the initial belief q1.
The expected payo® for the lender in period t for no loan is UL(NoLoan; t)
= 10 and for loan is UL(Loan; t) = (1¡qt)¢[PD(t)¢40 +[1¡PD(t)]¢¡100]+qt¢
[PH(t)¢40+[1¡PH(t)]¢¡100]. The expected payo® for the normal borrower





[PD(rjOt) ¢ 60 + (1 ¡ PD(rjOt)) ¢ 150] + (1 ¡ PL(rjOt)) ¢ 10g and choosing




r>tfPL(rjOt)[PD(rjOt) ¢ 60 + (1¡
PD(rjOt)) ¢150]+(1¡PL(rjOt)) ¢10g. The variable Ot is the set of possible
future paths of outcomes from time t + 1 up to time 8 (e.g. a possible
path for Ot might be Repay;Default;Default for t = 5.). PL(rjOt) is
the conditional probability of Loan at time r given the path Ot and there
are conditional beliefs qrjOt associated with these conditional probabilities.
We assume that the borrower would not consider any future path in which
he will go back to repay after turning default (e.g. default; repay; default
would not be in the set of O5.). The expected payo® for the honest borrower
can be de¯ned the same way.
Next, we propose the following procedure to update the belief in time t. If
we observe a repay in period t¡ 1, we update qt as follows:
qt =
qt¡1 ¢ PH(t¡ 1)
qt¡1 ¢ PH(t¡ 1) + (1¡ qt¡1) ¢ PD(t¡ 1) (A.1)
Otherwise, we update qt as follows:
qt =
qt¡1 ¢ (1¡ PH(t¡ 1))
qt¡1 ¢ (1¡ PH(t¡ 1)) + (1¡ qt¡1) ¢ (1¡ PD(t¡ 1)) (A.2)
We also update the conditional beliefs qrjOt with conditional probabilities
using the same procedure above. Note that we need to solve for a set of
conditional beliefs qrjOt that are consistent with all future paths we con-
sider. For example, if two future paths share the same outcomes up to
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time r0, then both paths should share the same set of conditional belief
qr0jOt up to r
0. Given that the conditional beliefs qrjOt are nonlinear in
PD(rjOt); PH(rjOt); PL(rjOt), we ¯nd the consistent set of qrjOt numeri-
cally.
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Table 1a: A summary of EWA parameter estimates and forecast accuracy (games estimated by us) 
 
  EWA estimates (standard error) Model accuracy Comments 
















Camerer, Ho and Hsia (2000) Sealed bid mechanism+ n.a.  1.00 0.91 1102.0 30.8 65.5 IN -LL y, w  & k replace d 
& r 
  
Camerer, Ho and Wang (1999) “Continental divide” coordination 0.75 0.61 0.00 346.9 86.1 235.8 OUT -LL  
 
Camerer and Ho (1998) Weak-link coordination 0.65 0.58 0.20 358.1 29.1 438.6 IN -LL  
 
Signaling games (game 3) 








72.2 6.5 10.1 OUT -LL  
 
Anderson and Camerer  (in press) 
Signaling games (game 5) 








139.5 14.1 23.7 OUT -LL  
 





0.00 (0.00) 41.1 39.2 72.8 OUT -LL  
 














341.7 18.0 8.4 OUT -LL Payoff =10 rupees 
 















362.3 13.7 8.9 OUT -LL 
 
 
Payoff =10 rupees 





























Camerer, Ho and Wang (1999) 













+ In Figure 1, we did not include this study.  








Table 1b: A summary of EWA parameter estimates and forecast accuracy (games estimated by others) 
 
  EWA estimates (standard error) Model accuracy Comments 























1729.5 0.6 n.a.  IN -LL 
 
 

































0.00 0.95 0.89 886.3 1.6 529.6 IN -LL 
 
High reward 
0.00 0.99 0.99 767.5 30.1 390.4 IN -LL 
 
Med. Reward 
Same function alliance – equal 
profit sharing 
0.07 0.89 0.87 1399.7 9.4 541.5 IN -LL 
 
Low reward 
0.00 0.99 1.00 910.8 36.4 813.0 IN -LL 
 
High reward 
0.00 0.92 0.96 1055.0 18.3 615.9 IN -LL 
 
Med. Reward 
Same function alliance – 
proportional sharing 
0.00 0.97 0.96 1013.7 13.3 1095.6 IN -LL 
 
Low reward 
0.00 0.91 0.59 1194.2 0.1 566.3 IN -LL 
 
High reward 




Parallel development of product – 
equal sharing 
0.21 0.88 0.66 1297.7 4.5 484.1 IN -LL 
 
Low reward 
0.00 0.94 0.93 3551.7 12.1 1097.7 IN -LL 
 
Low reward Patent race game – symmetric 
players 
0.00 0.97 0.98 2908.1 20.2 725.9 IN -LL 
 
High reward 
0.48 0.90 0.86 3031.5 89.1 706.8 IN -LL 
 
Strong player 
Rapoport and Amaldoss (2000) 
Patent race game – asymmetric 
players 
0.14 0.96 0.97 2835.5 15.7 611.0 IN -LL 
 
Weak player 
+  In Figure 1, we did not include this study. 
 
Table 2. Model Parameter Estimates for p-beauty Contest Game
INEXPERIENCED SUBJECTS EXPERIENCED SUBJECTS
Sophisticated Adaptive QRE1 Sophisticated Adaptive QRE
EWA EWA EWA EWA
Á 0.44 0.00 - 0.29 0.22 -
(0:05)2 (0.00) - (0.03) (0.03) -
± 0.78 0.90 - 0.67 0.99 -
(0.08) (0.05) - (0.05) (0.02) -
½ 0.00 0.00 - 0.01 0.00 -
(0.00) (0.00) - (0.00) (0.00) -
® 0.24 0.00 1.00 0.77 0.00 1.00
(0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00)
®0 0.00 0.00 - 0.41 0.00 -
(0.00) (0.00) - (0.03) (0.00) -
d 0.16 0.13 0.04 0.15 0.11 0.04
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
LL
(in sample) -2095.32 -2155.09 -2471.50 -1908.48 -2128.88 - 2141.45
(out of sample) -968.24 -992.47 -1129.25 -710.28 -925.09 - 851.31
Avg. Prob.
(in sample) 6% 5% 3% 7% 5% 5%
(out of sample) 7% 7% 4% 13% 9% 9%
1We also estimated the QRE model with di®erent ¸s in each period. For inexperienced players, the ¸s in period 2 to 6 are:
0.590; 0.663; 0.941; 1.220; 1.221; 1.381. In sample LL=-2460.51; out of sample LL=-1100.09. For experienced players, the
¸'s are 1.382; 2.627; 3.970; 5.249; 5.363; 8.399. In sample LL=-2074.25; out of sample LL=-769.19.
2Standard errors in parenthesis.
Table 3: Payo®s in the borrower-lender game, Camerer & Weigelt (1988)
Lender Borrower payo®s to payo®s to borrower
strategy strategy lender normal (X) honest (Y)
loan default ¡100¤ 150 0
repay 40 60 60
no loan no choice 10 10 10
Note: ¤ Loan-default lender payo®s were -50 in sessions 6-8 and -75 in sessions 9-10.
Table 4: A Comparison of In-Sample and Out-of-Sample Performance Between the Teaching and AQRE Models
Experiment No: 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10




Average Probability 75% 74% 75% 83% 75% 80% 59% 77%
Log-likelihood -268.85 -312.64 -277.98 -178.58 -281.96 -201.84 -443.21 -331.11
Agent-based Quantal Response Equilibrium (AQRE)
Average Probability 67% 67% 71% 82% 67% 73% 54% 76%
Log-likelihood -325.48 -350.97 -297.28 -190.02 -322.03 -247.49 -454.68 -320.52
Out-Of-Sample Validation
The Teaching Model
Average Probability 73% 73% 76% 86% 72% 78% 59% 79%
Log-likelihood -139.29 -141.04 -131.38 -69.60 -137.72 -98.46 -249.41 -137.50
Agent-based Quantal Response Equilibrium (AQRE)
Average Probability 70% 69% 74% 85% 66% 73% 54% 73%
Log-likelihood -144.58 -149.20 -126.32 -72.24 -159.49 -115.55 -270.72 -170.53
Note: Data source from Camerer and Weigelt (1988)
Table 5: Parameter Estimates of the Teaching Model
 Experiment No.: 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 No of Sequence (Total):   90 90 81 70 77 69 90 101
 
 
 Parameters for Adaptive Lender
f 0.29 0.64 0.71 0.72 0.55 0.68 0.69 0.09
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.07) (0.02)
d 0.34 0.19 0.34 0.88 0.18 0.65 0.40 0.49
(0.04) (0.06) (0.17) (0.26) (0.08) (0.14) (0.10) (0.06)
k 0.99 0.88 0.36 0.40 1.00 0.12 0.39 0.88
(0.02) (0.16) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.15) (0.84)
t 0.51 0.97 0.96 0.88 0.94 0.97 1.00 0.96
(0.02) (0.06) (0.04) (0.11) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
 Parameters for Adaptive Borrower
f 1.00 0.69 0.72 0.52 0.93 0.69 0.10 0.72
(0.15) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.11) (0.03)
d 0.17 0.44 0.79 0.48 0.47 0.55 0.16 0.33
(0.17) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.18) (0.06)
k 0.90 0.89 0.67 0.73 0.58 0.83 0.82 0.58
(0.21) (0.06) (0.21) (0.20) (0.11) (0.14) (0.17) (0.12)
t 0.10 0.36 0.55 0.11 0.55 0.35 0.25 0.43
(0.23) (0.08) (0.07) (0.05) (0.09) (0.05) (0.31) (0.09)
 Parameters for Sophisticated Borrower
e 1.00 1.00 0.95 0.93 0.22 0.93 0.19 0.25
(0.01) (0.28) (0.09) (0.21) (0.21) (0.27) (0.13) (0.17)
a 0.70 0.26 0.14 0.03 0.07 0.28 0.99 0.03
(0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.03) (0.06) (0.08) (0.30) (0.03)
Note: Each parameter is presented with its standard error (in parenthesis) directly below. 
